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Abstract—Spatial modulation (SM) and space shift keying
(SSK) represent transmission methods for low-complexity im-
plementation of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless
systems in which antenna indices are employed for data transmis-
sion. In this paper, we focus our attention on the secrecy behavior
of SSK and SM. Using an information-theoretic framework, we
derive expressions for the mutual information and consequently
compute achievable secrecy rates for SSK and SM via numerical
evaluations. We also characterize the secrecy behavior of SSK by
showing the effects of increasing the number of antennas at the
transmitter as well as the number of antennas at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper. We further evaluate the secrecy
rates achieved by SM with different sizes of the underlying signal
constellation and compare the secrecy performance of this scheme
with those of general MIMO and SIMO systems. The proposed
framework unveils that SM is capable of achieving higher secrecy
rates than the conventional single-antenna transmission schemes.
However, it underperfoms compared to a general MIMO system
in terms of the achievable secrecy rates.
Index Terms — Physical layer security, MIMO wiretap chan-
nel, spatial modulation, space shift keying, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems are de-
signed to either increase the capacity or to enhance the relia-
bility of wireless links [1]. This enhancement is attained at the
price of higher complexity, increased hardware requirements
and higher power consumption due to the need for multiple
radio-frequency (RF) chains. Spatial modulation (SM) and
space shift keying (SSK) are relatively new MIMO transmis-
sion schemes in which only one of the transmit antennas is
active at each time instant. By employing these transmission
schemes spatial multiplexing gains can be achieved with a
reduced complexity and a smaller power consumption due
to the fact that ideally a single RF chain is required at the
transmitter [2]. The key idea in SM and SSK is to encode the
information bits into the index of the activated antenna. While
antenna indices are the only information-carrying units in SSK
[3], SM takes advantage of a conventional amplitude or phase
modulation along with the antenna indices to transmit data [4].
Even though the performances of SSK and SM have been
extensively studied for different scenarios [5]- [6], very limited
attention has been paid to the secrecy behavior of these
schemes. The fundamental setup in physical layer security has
been introduced by Wyner in [7], where secure communication
has been studied over a wiretap channel in the presence of
an eavesdropper. It was shown in [7] that confidential mes-
sages can be transmitted securely without using an encryption
key if the channel capacity of the link from source to the
legitimate receiver is higher than that of the wiretap link.
In subsequent literature, Wyner’s results have been extended
to other scenarios such as Gaussian wiretap channels [8].
More recently, the emergence and increasing pervasiveness
of wireless communication systems have spurred considerable
interest in investigation of these systems in the context of
secure communications [9]. As an intuitive extension, the
information theoretic secrecy capacity of MIMO communi-
cation systems has been analyzed in [10] and [11]. More
specifically, it has been proved in [11] that for an arbitrary
number of transmit/receive antennas, the secrecy capacity is
the difference of the two mutual information terms, i.e. that of
the legitimate receiver minus that of the eavesdropper, after a
suitable optimization over the input covariance matrix.
An initial study of the secrecy capacity of SM has been
provided in [12] where the contribution of the spatial compo-
nent in the overall capacity has been neglected. The secrecy
capacity of the spatial component of SM and SSK systems
has been characterized in a semi-analytical fashion in [13],
where the error probabilities of SSK, which are obtained via
simulations, have been used in the expression for secrecy
capacity of the binary symmetric channel (BSC).
As the study in [13] is limited to a system with two transmit
antennas and it is only semi-analytical and approximate, here
we propose an analytic framework which allows us to give
a characterization of the secrecy behavior of SSK systems
with different number of transmit and receive antennas. To this
end, with the assumption that the antennas are equally likely
to be activated, we define an achievable secrecy rate as the
difference of the mutual information quantities corresponding
to the legitimate receiver’s and the eavesdropper’s channels.
Then, we derive an expression for the mutual information of
SSK and extend it to the more general case of SM. For both
SSK and SM we characterize the above-mentioned achievable
secrecy rates via numerical evaluations applied on the derived
mutual information expressions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our
system model and explains the definition of the secrecy rate.
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Fig. 1: The MIMOME secrecy model.
In Section III, we derive expressions for the corresponding
mutual information terms. Numerical results are provided in
Section IV, and we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a general multiple-input multiple-output
multiple-antenna-eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channel
as depicted in Fig. 1. While Alice transmits a spatially
modulated signal to the legitimate receiver, Bob, a third party,
Eve, is present with capability of eavesdropping on Alice’s
signal. Alice, Bob and Eve are assumed to be equipped with
Nt, Nrb and Nre antennas, respectively. In this section, we
formulate the received signals and also define an achievable
secrecy rate for two separate cases where SSK and SM are
employed at the transmitter.
The notation of this paper is as follows. Scalars and vectors
are denoted with the lowercase letters. Uppercase letters are
used to represent matrices. Random variables are denoted with
the boldface letters. The expectation value and the probability
mass (or density) function of a random variable a are repre-
sented by EA{.} and PA(.), respectively. Moreover, (.)H and
k . kF denote Hermitian and Frobenius norm operations.
A. Space Shift Keying
By employing SSK at the transmitter, the received signals
y and z at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper can be
represented, respectively, as
y = Hbx + ny (1)
z = Hex + nz, (2)
where, x 2 {x1, x2, ..., xNt} is the SSK signal vector which
is of the form
xm = [0 0 ... 1 ... 0 0],
"
mth element
with the position of “1” indicating the antenna being activated.
ny and nz are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
additive white Gaussian noise terms which follow circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian distributions, CN (0, 2ny ) and
CN (0, 2nz ), respectively. Hb and He are the channel matrices
corresponding to the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel, respectively. The elements of the channel matrices are
i.i.d. with distribution CN (0, 1). Furthermore, Hb, He, ny and
nz are independent. It is assumed that the fading process is
ergodic. The legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper know
their own channels perfectly. However, no channel state infor-
mation is available at the transmitter.
Secrecy capacity can be defined as the rate at which
transmitter can use the main link so as to deliver its message to
the legitimate receiver in a way that the eavesdropper cannot
successfully decode the same information. Based on [14],
when  2ny <  
2
nz and Nre  Nrb , the MIMOME secrecy




I(x; y|Hb)  I(x; z|He)
 
, (3)
where the optimization is over the input distribution. It is
well known that for a symmetric discrete memoryless channel,
mutual information is maximized with equiprobable inputs
[15, p. 94]. With a similar reasoning, it can be claimed that
the maximum of I(x; y|H) is achieved with a source with








if I(x; y|Hb) < I(x; z|He) and zero otherwise. This quantifies
the information being secretly transmitted with the assumption
that the active antennas are selected equiprobably. Indeed,
RSSKs is simply a lower bound on the secrecy capacity given
in (3) in view of the fact that PX(x) = 1/Nt is not necessarily
the input distribution which maximizes the expression in (3).
B. Spatial Modulation
While the antenna indices are the only source of information
in SSK transmission, SM additionally employs an amplitude
or phase modulation scheme. In this case, the received signals
at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can be written
as:
y0 = Hbxs + ny0 (5)
z0 = Hexs + nz0 , (6)
where s 2 {s1, s2, ..., sN} denotes the symbol chosen from
an equiprobable discrete signal constellation with size N . We
assume that a power constraint of unity, i.e., E{|s|2} = 1,









which is the difference between the mutual information terms
corresponding to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
with the assumption that the amplitude or phase modulation
symbols are selected equiprobably, PS(s) = 1/N , along with
the same assumption for the antenna indices, i.e., PX(x) =
1/Nt.
III. MUTUAL INFORMATION AND SECRECY RATE
In this section, we separately derive expressions for the
mutual information of SSK and SM. These expressions make
possible the evaluation of the secrecy rates in (4) and (7).
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A. Space Shift Keying
So as to characterize the secrecy rate of SSK, we are
required to evaluate the mutual information between the source
and the destination, i.e., I(x; y|Hb), as well as the mutual
information between the source and the eavesdropper, i.e.,
I(x; z|He). For Nr ⇥ Nt MIMO channel, H ⇠ CN (0, 1),
mutual information can be calculated using the following
formula [16, Eq. (2.28)]:












The Nr-dimensional received signal follows a complex Gaus-






exp(  k y  Hxm k2F / 2n). (9)
As stated in the previous section we assume that the antennas
are selected equiprobably, i.e., PX(x) = 1Nt . Note that this is
due to the fact that in the absence of channel state information
at the transmitter (CSIT), the active antenna sets are equally















By substituting (9)-(12) in (8), the mutual information for SSK
can be derived as:











exp(  k y   Hxm k2F / 2n)⇥
log
Nt exp(  k y   Hxm k2F / 2n)PNt






For SM, the mutual information between the two inputs
and the output can be written by using the chain rule [16, Eq.
2.62], as:
I(x, s; y0|H) = I(x; y0|H) + I(s; y0|x,H). (14)
The term I(x; y0|H) is simply the mutual information for SSK
which is given in (13). The second term, i.e. I(s; y0|x,H), can







































exp(  k y0  Hxsn k2F / 2n). (19)
By substitution of the conditional PDFs above in (15) we have









exp(  k y0   Hxsn k2F / 2n)⇥
log
N exp(  k y0   Hxsn k2F / 2n)PN





According to (14), the mutual information for SM is equal
to the summation of the terms in (13) and (20). Namely, the
overall mutual information has two components; one associ-
ated with the spatial component and the other corresponding
to the conventional modulation bits. Hence by employing SM
instead of SSK, we can increase the mutual information by the
amount of mutual information corresponding to the radiated
symbol, i.e., I(s; y0|x,H). While the higher rate of SM with
respect to SSK is expected, secrecy behavior of these two
transmission schemes requires further investigation as explored
in Section IV.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we quantify the achievable secrecy rate
of SSK and SM. For SSK, the secrecy rate is calculated
using (4) and by numerically evaluating the mutual informa-
tion expression given in (13), for the main channel and the
eavesdropper’s channel. Fig. 2 depicts the secrecy rate for the
case with a single receive antenna at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper. This rate is evaluated via subtracting
the mutual information associated with the eavesdropper’s
channel from the mutual information corresponding to the
legitimate user’s channel. In this evaluation, by considering
i.i.d. channel coefficients from different transmit antennas, the
secrecy rate is averaged over many channel realizations and
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a) SNR @ Eavesdropper = 0 dB
 
 










b) SNR @ Eavesdropper = 12 dB
 
 























Fig. 2: Secrecy rate for a SSK system with different number
of transmit antennas. Nre = Nrb = 1.
plotted versus legitimate user’s signal to noise ratio (SNR),
while it is assumed that the eavesdropper’s SNR is fixed at 0,
12 and 21 dB. It can be inferred from Fig. 2 that for the case
where eavesdropper’s SNR is fixed to 0 dB, increasing the
number of transmit antennas from 2 to 4 and 8 gives rise to 1
and 2 bits/s/Hz enhancement in the secrecy rate, respectively.
By comparing the Figures 2-(a) , 2-(b) and 2-(c), it can be
observed that the secrecy rates are decreased when we increase
the SNR at the eavesdropper. This is to be expected due to the
fact that by increasing the Eve’s SNR, we decrease the gap
between Bob’s and Eve’s SNRs and this gives rise to a smaller
difference between the corresponding mutual informations.
Furthermore, it is inferred that for the cases where Eve has
higher SNRs, the advantages of larger number of transmit
antennas is more apparent.
The effects of increasing the number of receive antennas
is shown in Fig. 3. Four antennas have been considered at
the transmitter and the secrecy capacity has been evaluated by
varying the legitimate receiver’s SNR for three cases where the
eavesdropper’s SNR is fixed at 0, 12 and 21 dB, respectively.
These results declare that increasing the number of antennas
at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper results in a
decreased secrecy level. This behavior is different from the
capacity behavior of SSK in the sense that a higher number of
receive antennas results in an increased achievable information
rate (see, e.g., Fig. 5 in [18]). This is due to the fact that
increasing the number of receive antennas at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper leads to a capacity gain for both
of the receivers and as a result the behavior of secrecy capacity
differs from that of capacity.
In order to characterize the secrecy behavior of SM, we
quantify the secrecy rate using (7) and via numerical eval-
uations of the mutual information expressions for the main
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, given in (20). Fig. 4
shows the secrecy rate for SM. It can be observed that SM

















a) SNR @ Eavesdropper = 0 dB
 
 










b) SNR @ Eavesdropper = 12 dB
 
 






















Fig. 3: Secrecy rate for a SSK system with different number
of receiver antennas at the legitimate receiver and the eaves-
dropper. Nt = 4, Nre = Nrb = Nr.
provides larger secrecy rates than SSK. Also, by increasing
the size of the underlying signal constellation, namely N , a
better performance is attained for SM. This is due to the fact
that in SM, utilization of a conventional modulation along
with encoding of the data in the antenna index introduces a
further randomization which enhances the achievable secrecy
rate. Similar to the case for SSK, when Eve’s SNR is higher,
SM’s secrecy rates are decreased. In these conditions, system
benefits more from the increased signal constellation size.
What we can recognize from Fig. 4 is that for a fixed
number of transmit antennas, employing an amplitude or
phase modulation along with the spatial encoding of data can
increase the secrecy rate. This increased secrecy rate is attained





















a) SNR @ Eavesdropper = 0 dB
 
 










b) SNR @ Eavesdropper = 12 dB
 
 




























Fig. 4: Secrecy rate for a SM system with different underlying
signal constellations. Nt = 2, Nre = Nrb = 1.
2015 IEEE International Black Sea Conference on Communications and Networking (BlackSeaCom)
66
























a) SNR @ Eavesdropper = 0 dB
 
 










b) SNR @ Eavesdropper = 12 dB
 
 














c) SNR @ Eve = 21 dB
 
 
MIMO, Nt = 4, N = 4
SM, Nt = 4, N = 4
SIMO, N = 4
MIMO, Nt = 4, N = 4
SM, Nt = 4, N = 4
SIMO, N = 4
MIMO, Nt = 4, N = 4
SM, Nt = 4, N = 4
SIMO, N = 4
Fig. 5: Comparison of secrecy rates for SM and general MIMO
and SIMO systems. N = 4, Nre = Nrb = 2.
at the price of increased detection complexity and higher bit
error rates (BERs). This is because increasing the order of
modulation which is advantageous from a secrecy perspective,
on the other hand, gives rise to a decreased minimum distance
between the points in the signal-constellation and results in a
higher probability of error.
In Fig. 5 the secrecy rates of SM have been compared
to those of general MIMO and SIMO systems with finite
alphabet inputs with N = 4, namely, using quadrature phase
shift keying (QPSK) transmission. The results for the general
MIMO have been obtained using [19, Eq. (5)]. Fig. 5 clearly
shows that SM can yield an improved secrecy performance
with respect to the SIMO case due to taking advantage of
multiple transmit antennas. Yet, its secrecy rate is notably less
than a general MIMO transmission where all of the transmitted
antennas are activated. In fact, this degradation is the price that
should be paid to take advantage of appealing features of SM
in terms of complexity and cost.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we derived expressions for achievable se-
crecy rates for SSK and SM using an information-theoretic
framework. We then studied the secrecy behavior of these low-
complexity MIMO transmission schemes for different number
of transmit and receive antennas, and for different sizes of
underlying signal constellation. Moreover, we compared the
secrecy rates achieved by SM with those of general SIMO
and MIMO systems. Our results show that SM is capable of
achieving a better secrecy rate with respect to a single-antenna
transmission. However, there is a gap between the secrecy rates
of SM and a general MIMO system in which all transmit
antennas are activated in each time instant. The framework
proposed in this paper can serve as a basis for future studies
on spatial encoding of data in the context of secure wireless
communications.
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